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Abstract
In this commentary, we argue for the implementation of a sugar-
sweetened beverage (SSB) tax as a tool to help address the global 
obesity and diabetes epidemics.  Consumption of SSBs has increased 
exponentially over the last several decades, a trend that has been 
an important contributor to the obesity and diabetes epidemics. 
Prior evidence demonstrates that a SSB tax will likely decrease 
SSB consumption without significantly increasing consumption 
of other unhealthy food or beverages. Further, this tax is unlikely 
to have effects on income inequality and should not contribute to 
weight-based discrimination.  A SSB tax also should raise revenue 
for government entities that already pay, through health care 
expenditures and health programs, for the consequences of excess 
SSB consumption.
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In his perspective, “Food taxes: a new holy grail?”, Professor Ignaas Devisch critiques the use of taxes on unhealthy foods to address the rising global burden of obesity and overweight 
(1). He argues against such taxes because of 1) purportedly 
limited data showing dietary improvement from food taxes, 
2) concerns for unintended consequences such as increasing 
consumption of other unhealthy products, 3) promotion of 
further income inequality, 4) the tendency of such taxation to 
“[scapegoat] those groups who are expected to benefit the most 
from government intervention” (i.e., the overweight and obese), 
and 5) limited documented public support for these taxes.
However, must we condemn all possible food tax remedies 
because of unsubstantiated concerns about something as 
imprecise as a “food tax”?  Not all food taxes are created equal, 
and we believe that a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) is 
not only justified but is an important tool to address the global 
epidemics of obesity and diabetes.  SSBs are clearly fuelling these 
joint epidemics.  Over the last several decades, consumption of 
SSBs has at least doubled for both children and adults in the 
United States (2–5). In one nationally-representative survey 
from 1999 to 2004, US adolescents (12 to 19 years of age) 
consumed on average 301 kcal/day in SSBs, representing 13% of 
total daily calorie intake.  Among those adolescents consuming 
at least one SSB on the day they were surveyed, average intake 
was 356 kcal/day, 16% of total daily calorie intake.  Intake was 
lower for younger children but still averaged 124 kcal/day for 
2-to-5-year olds and 184 kcal/day for 6-to-11-year olds (4). U.S. 
adults 20+ years of age consumed 203 kcal/day, 9% of total daily 
calorie intake, with higher consumption among those with lower 
income (2); 10% of U.S. Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program recipients consumed more than 5 servings of soda per 
day (6). In fact, SSBs are the single largest contributor to calorie 
consumption of all food and beverage types (7). These trends are 
by no means unique to the US.  Evidence demonstrates high SSB 
consumption across the world with exponential increases over 
the last several decades (8–11).
These numbers are especially impressive when considering the 
calorie consumption that was necessary to create the obesity 
epidemic.  Wang et al., estimated that a reduction of 131 kcal/
day over the approximately 10-year period from 1988–1994 to 
1999–2002 would have reversed the 0.43 kg/year weight gain that 
was observed among 2-to-7 year olds.  Substantial other data has 
documented the negative impact of SSB consumption on body 
weight and risk for diabetes (12–15), and new randomized trial 
data has demonstrated the potential for weight loss by reducing 
SSB consumption (16,17). SSBs are a logical and important target 
for obesity prevention policies, especially when considering the 
utter lack of nutritional value found in most SSBs and the lack 
of appropriate satiety signals and calorie compensation when 
consuming SSBs (18–21).
To address Professor Devisch’s critiques, when applied to a 
SSB tax, we begin by addressing the state of the data that he 
laments.  Much evidence demonstrates the effect, or likely effect, 
of taxes on SSB consumption (3,22–29). Several studies, most 
focused on soda/soft drinks, have documented associations 
between higher SSB prices and lower consumption. Authors 
have utilized various methods, including observational data 
on food prices and consumption (22,26), household survey 
data on food purchases (23,27–29), and experimental studies 
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(25). A 2009 systematic review of food price elasticities found 
a price elasticity of demand of -0.79 (95% CI 0.33, 1.24) for 
soft drinks, estimated from 14 different studies.  This elasticity 
suggests that for every 10% increase in the price of soft drinks, 
sales would decline by 7.9%. Additional studies have found very 
similar elasticities (22,25) or even higher responsiveness to price 
(i.e., less inelastic demand) (3,23,27–29). Two recent studies 
conservatively projected calorie reductions per capita from SSB 
taxes, accounting for potential substitutions to other beverages 
and foods. Finkelstein et al. estimated a 24.3 kcal/day per capita 
calorie deficit from a 20% tax, leading to a 0.7 kg average weight 
loss in one year and 1.32 kg weight loss in 10 years (27). Lin et 
al. estimated a 34 kcal/day reduction from a 20% tax, leading to 
a 0.97 kg average weight loss in one year and 1.8 kg weight loss 
in 10 years (3). These results, when considered on a population 
level, are important changes over time and would alter the 
prevalence of obesity and overweight. SSB taxes will likely 
“work”. Further, these data address Professor Devisch’s second 
concern regarding the likely substitution to unhealthy products 
after a food tax, thereby leading to a cancellation of any positive 
effects from a tax. At least for SSBs, the substitutions appear to 
be small, are not necessarily to unhealthy options, and do not 
reverse the overall reduction in calories from a tax (3,25,27). 
Finkelstein et al. even found a reduction in calories from foods 
coinciding with a SSB tax.
On to the arguments regarding income inequality and 
scapegoating the obese and overweight.  In their projections of 
the effect of a 20% SSB tax, Lin et al. found that the typical burden 
of such a tax on low-income individuals (those making less than 
185% of the US federal poverty guideline) would be 19.97 US 
dollars annually, equivalent to 1% of the average annual food 
budget.  Higher-income individuals would pay $18.84.  Another 
similar study found a SSB tax to be similarly regressive but, 
again, of small magnitude (28). Because low income individuals 
are projected to lose slightly more weight from a SSB tax than 
higher income individuals, this income burden may be more 
than abated by health improvements.  Scapegoating of the obese 
and overweight is a concern.  However, with the intense global 
attention to SSBs as a major contributor to the obesity epidemic, 
it seems unlikely that a targeted SSB tax would worsen the typical 
bias facing many overweight and obese individuals. Leading 
organizations advocating against weight-based discrimination 
also tend to support SSB taxation (30,31). Foregoing important 
population-based obesity prevention strategies, such as targeted 
taxation, because of the miniscule risk of worsening bias seems 
counterproductive.
Finally, consideration of public opinion regarding policy 
change is critical when projecting the likelihood of adopting 
SSB taxes.  In the US, hardly the bastion of pro-tax policy, 34 
states and the District of Columbia have taxes on SSBs, with 
22 states and the District of Columbia having higher taxes on 
soda than on regular food. These states include some of the 
most politically conservative states in the US, including Texas, 
Kentucky, and North Dakota. National public opinion data 
regarding support for soda taxes in the United States is mixed 
(32–35). When a general question regarding soda taxes is posed 
to poll respondents, 36% or fewer support a soda tax (33–35); 
however, when revenue from a soda tax is connected to a social 
good, such as providing health insurance or funding obesity 
prevention programs, approximately one-half of respondents 
support such a tax (32).
Of course, existing SSB taxes are quite small presently and 
likely ineffective in decreasing consumption, which has never 
been the intended purpose of these taxes. In 2011, the mean US 
state sales tax on soda was 5.2% (36). For those states that have a 
dedicated soda tax, the mean dedicated tax, not including sales 
taxes generally applied to all food items, was between 1.5% to 
2.3%  from 1989 to 2006 (37). These small tax rates have been 
associated with little to no difference in SSB consumption or 
BMI, when comparing states with to those without taxes (37–41). 
If a tax was seen as more effective in improving health, such as 
what could likely be achieved with a larger tax, public opinion 
may shift. Further, many public policies that have became widely 
popular and viewed as important for public health (e.g., tobacco 
taxes, public insurance programs like the United States’ Medicare 
and Social Security programs) were initially met with skepticism 
(42,43). SSB taxes also conform to a long tradition of influencing 
food choices and prices through governmental policy; however, 
these taxes differ from other such policies because they should 
explicitly improve public health. Other widely used food 
economic policies, such as agricultural subsidies, have no such 
intention, and in fact can detract from public health. A SSB tax 
also should raise revenue for government entities that already 
pay, through health care expenditures and health programs, for 
the consequences of excess SSB consumption.
Ultimately, a SSB tax should never be viewed as a “holy grail”. 
Nor can a firm conclusion be made that a SSB tax will have a 
specific effect. However, calling this “riddled with uncertainty” 
would be extreme.  In fact, no policy, in public health, health 
care, or beyond, has perfectly predictable effects, and expecting 
such would doom any policy change.  Also, no policy should be 
viewed in isolation but rather as part of a comprehensive effort. 
Addressing a crisis such as the obesity and diabetes epidemics 
requires a comprehensive approach toward all contributing 
factors, including encouraging healthy dietary choices and 
increasing physical activity.  A dedicated food tax on SSBs is a 
reasonable approach backed by strong evidence that can help 
stem this tide.
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